Abstract. We propose a block-cipher mode of operation, EAX, for solving the problem of authenticated-encryption with associated-data (AEAD). Given a nonce AE, a message Å, and a header À, our mode protects the privacy of Å and the authenticity of both Å and À. Strings AE, Å, and À are arbitrary bit strings, and the mode uses ¾ Å Ò · À Ò · AE Ò block-cipher calls when these strings are nonempty and Ò is the block length of the underlying block cipher. Among EAX's characteristics are that it is on-line (the length of a message isn't needed to begin processing it) and a fixed header can be pre-processed, effectively removing the per-message cost of binding it to the ciphertext.
Introduction
An authenticated encryption (AE) scheme is a symmetric-key mechanism by which a message Å is a transformed into a ciphertext Ì with the goal that Ì protect both the privacy and the authenticity of Å. The last few years has seen the emergence of AE as a recognized cryptographic goal. With this has come the development of new authenticated-encryption schemes and the analysis of old ones. This paper offers up a new authenticated-encryption scheme, EAX, and provides a thorough analysis of it. To understand why we are defining a new AE scheme, we need to give some background. make and elaborate on there are the following. CCM is not on-line, meaning one needs to know the lengths of both the plaintext and the associated data before one can proceed with encryption. This may be inconvenient or inefficient. CCM does not allow preprocessing of static associated data. (If, for example, we have an unchanging header attached to every packet being authenticated, we would like that the cost of authenticating this header be paid only once, meaning header authentication should have no significant cost after a single pre-computation. CCM fails to have this property.) CCM's parameterization is more complex than necessary, including, in addition to the block cipher and tag length, a message-length parameter. CCM's nonce length is restricted in such a way that it may not provide adequate security when nonces are chosen randomly. Finally, CCM implementations could suffer performance hits because the algorithm can disrupt word alignment in the associated data.
EAX AND ITS ATTRIBUTES. EAX is a nonce-using AEAD scheme employing no tool beyond the block cipher Ã Ý ¢ ¼ ½ Ò ¼ ½ Ò on which it is based. We expect that will often be instantiated by AES, but we make no restrictions in this direction.
(In particular we do not require that Ò ½¾ .) Nothing is assumed about the nonces except that they are non-repeating. EAX provides both privacy, in the sense of indistinguishability from random bits, and authenticity, in the sense of an adversary's inability to produce a new but valid nonce, header, ciphertext triple. EAX is simple, avoiding complicated length-annotation. It is a conventional two-pass AEAD scheme, making a separate privacy pass and authenticity pass, using no known intellectual property.
EAX is flexible in the functionality it provides. It supports arbitrary-length messages: the message space is ¼ ½ £ . The key space for EAX is the key space Ã Ý of the underlying block cipher. EAX supports arbitrary nonces, meaning the nonce space is ¼ ½ £ . Any tag length ¾ ¼ Ò℄ is possible, to allow each user to select how much security she wants from the authenticity guarantees. The only user-selectable parameters are the block cipher and that tag length . EAX has desirable performance attributes. Message expansion is minimal: the length of the ciphertext (which, following the conventions of [25] , excludes the nonce) is only bits more than the length of the plaintext. Implementations can profitably preprocess static associated data. (If an unchanging header is attached to every packet, authenticating this header has no significant cost after a single pre-computation.) Keysetup is efficient: all block-cipher calls use the same underlying key, so that we do not incur the cost of key scheduling more than once. For both encryption and decryption, EAX uses only the forward direction of the block cipher, so that hardware implementations do not need to implement the decryption functionality of the block cipher. The scheme is on-line for both the plaintext Å and the associated data À, which means that one can process streaming data on-the-fly, using constant memory, not knowing when the stream will stop. PROVABLE SECURITY. We prove that EAX is secure assuming that the block cipher that it uses is a secure pseudorandom permutation (PRP). Security for EAX means indistinguishability from random bits and authenticity of ciphertexts. The combination implies other desirable goals, like nonmalleability and indistinguishability under a chosen-ciphertext attack.
The proof of security for EAX is surprisingly complex. The key-collapse of EAX2 destroys a fundamental abstraction boundary. Our security proof relies on a result about the security of a tweakable extension of OMAC (Lemma 3) in which an adversary can obtain not only a tag for a message of its choice, but also an associated key-stream.
PRAGMATICS. The main reason there is any interest in two-pass schemes, as we have already discussed, is that one-pass schemes would seem to be subject to patents. Motivated by this, standardization bodies have expressed the intent of standardizing on a conventional, two-pass scheme, even understanding the factor-of-two performance hit. The merit of this judgment is debatable, but the pragmatic reality is that there has emerged a desire for a conventional scheme, like EAX, that is as good as possible subject to the two-pass constraint. Lack of a scheme like EAX will simply lead to an inferior scheme being standardized, which is to the disadvantage of the user community. Accordingly, EAX addresses a real and practical design problem. We took up work on this design problem at the suggestion of the co-Chair of the IRTF (Internet Research Task Force), which supports the standardization efforts of the IETF. We believe that EAX has the potential for widespread adoption and use.
AFTERWARDS. One non-goal of EAX was to be parallelizable. Another recent twopass design, CWC [19] , is parallelizable. It pays for this advantage with a somewhat complex algorithm, based on Carter-Wegman hashing using polynomial evaluation over a prime field. More recent still is GCM [22] , a parallelizable, two-pass design based on multiplication in the finite field with ¾ ½¾ elements.
Other recent AEAD mechanisms include Helix [10] and SOBER-128 [13] . These are stream ciphers that aim to provide authenticity. The provable-security methodology does not apply to these objects since they are built directly rather than from lower level primitives.
Preliminaries
All strings in this paper are over the binary alphabet ¼ ½ . For Ä a set of strings and In Figure 1 we define the algorithms CBC, CTR, Ô , OMAC (no superscript), and OMAC¯(with superscript). The algorithms CBC (the CBC MAC) and CTR (countermode encryption) are standard. Algorithm Ô is used only to define OMAC. Algorithm OMAC [14] is a pseudorandom function (PRF) that is a one-key variant of the algorithm XCBC [9] . Algorithm OMAC¯is like OMAC but takes an extra argument, the integer Ø. This algorithm is a "tweakable" PRF [21] , tweaked in the most simple way possible.
We explain the notation used in the definition of OMAC. The value of Ä (line 40:
an integer in ¾ and Ä ¾ ¼ ½ Ò ) is the Ò-bit string that is obtained by multiplying Ä by the Ò-bit string that represents the number . The multiplication is done in the finite field ´¾ Ò µ using a canonical polynomial to represent field points. The canonical polynomial we select is the lexicographically first polynomial among the irreducible polynomials of degree Ò that have a minimum number of nonzero coefficients. For Ò ½¾ the indicated polynomial is Ü ½¾ · Ü · Ü ¾ · Ü · ½. In that case, ¾Ä Ä ½ if the first bit of Ä is ¼ and ¾Ä ´Ä ½µ¨¼ ½¾¼ ½¼¼¼¼½½½ otherwise, where Ä ½ means the left shift of Ä by one position (the first bit vanishing and a zero entering into the last bit). The value of Ä is simply ¾´¾Äµ. We warn that to avoid side-channel attacks one must implement the doubling operation in a constant-time manner. We have made a small modification to the OMAC algorithm as it was originally presented, changing one of its two constants. Specifically, the constant 4 at line 40 was the constant ½ ¾ (the multiplicative inverse of ¾) in the original definition of OMAC [14] . The OMAC authors indicate that they will promulgate this modification [15] , which slightly simplifies implementations.
The EAX Algorithm
ALGORITHM. Fix a block cipher Ã Ý ¢ ¼ ½ Ò ¼ ½ Ò and a tag length ¾ ¼ Ò℄. These parameters should be fixed at the beginning of a particular session that will use EAX mode. Typically, the parameters would be agreed to in an authenticated manner between the sender and the receiver, or they would be fixed for all time for some particular application. Given these parameters, EAX provides a nonce-based AEAD scheme EAX ℄ whose encryption algorithm has signature Ã Ý¢AEÓÒ ¢À Ö¢ ÈÐ ÒØ ÜØ Ô ÖØ ÜØ and whose decryption algorithm has signature Ã Ý ¢ AEÓÒ ¢ À Ö ¢ Ô ÖØ ÜØ ÈÐ ÒØ ÜØ INVALID where AEÓÒ , À Ö, ÈÐ ÒØ ÜØ, and Ô ÖØ ÜØ are all ¼ ½ £ . The EAX algorithm is specified in Figure 2 and a picture illustrating EAX encryption is given in Figure 3 . We now discuss various features of our algorithm and choices underlying the design. NO ENCODINGS. We have avoided any nontrivial encoding of multiple strings into a single one. 1 Some other approaches that we considered required a PRF to be applied to what was logically a tuple, like´AE À µ. Doing this raises encoding issues we did not want to deal with because, ultimately, there would seem to be no simple, efficient, compelling, on-line way to encode multiple strings into a single one. Alternatively, one 1 One could view the prefixing of Ø℄Ò to Å in the definition of ÇÅ Ø Ã´Å µ as an encoding, but Ø℄Ò is a constant, fixed-length string, and the aim here is just to "tweak" the PRF. This is very different from needing to encode arbitrary-length strings into a single string. could avoid encodings and consider a new kind of primitive, a multi-argument PRF. But this would be a non-standard tool and we didn't want to use any non-standard tools. All in all, it seemed best to find a way to sidestep the need to do encodings.
WHY NOT GENERIC COMPOSITION? Why have we specified a block-cipher based (BC-based) AEAD scheme instead of following the generic-composition approach of combining a (privacy-only) encryption method and a message authentication code? In fact, there are reasonable arguments in favor of generic composition, based on aesthetic or architectural sensibilities. One can argue that generic composition better separates conceptually independent elements (privacy and authenticity) and, correspondingly, allows greater implementation flexibility [6, 20] . Correctness becomes much simpler and clearer as well. All the same, BC-based AEAD modes have some important advantages of their own. They make it easier for implementors to use a scheme without knowing a lot of cryptography, presenting a simpler abstraction boundary. They make it easier to obtain interoperably. They reduce the risk that implementors will choose insecure parameters. They can save on key bits and key-setup time, as generic-composition methods invariably require a pair of separate keys.
EAX can be viewed as having been derived from a generic-composition scheme we call EAX2, described in Section 4. Specifically, one instantiates EAX2 using CTR mode (counter mode) and OMAC, and then collapses the two keys into one. If one favors generic composition, EAX2 is a nice algorithm for it.
ON-LINE. We say that an algorithm is on-line if it is able to process a stream of data as it arrives, with constant memory, not knowing in advance when the stream will end. Observe then that on-line methods should not require knowledge of the length of a message until the message is finished. A failure to be on-line has been regarded as a significant defect for an encryption scheme or a MAC. EAX is on-line. Now it is true that in many contexts where one would be encrypting a string one does know the length of the string in advance. For example, many protocols will already have "packaged up" the string length at a lower level. In effect, such strings have been represented in the computing system as sequence of bytes and a count of those bytes. But there are also contexts where one does not know the length of a message in advance of getting an indication that it is over. For examples, a printable string is often represented in computer systems as a sequence of non-zero bytes followed by a terminal zero-byte. Certainly one should be able to efficiently encrypt a string which has been represented in this way.
ABILITY TO PROCESS STATIC AD. In many scenarios the associated data À will be static over the course of a communications session. For example, the associated data may include information such as the IP address of the sender, the receiver, and fixed cryptographic parameters associated to this session. In such a case one would like that the amount of time to compute Encrypt AE À Ã´Å µ and Decrypt AE À Ã´ µ should be independent of À , disregarding the work done in a preprocessing step. The significance of this goal was already explained in [24] . EAX achieves this goal.
ADDITIONAL FEATURES. Invalid messages can be rejected at half the cost of decryption. This is one of the benefits of following what is basically an encrypt-thenauthenticate approach as opposed to an authenticate-then-encrypt approach.
To obtain a MAC as efficient as the PRF underlying EAX define Å Ã´À µ 
EAX2 Algorithm
To understand the the proof of security of EAX and the approach taken for its design, we introduce EAX2, a generic composition method. EAX is EAX2 for the particular case of CTR encryption and OMAC authentication, but then collapsed to a single key. 
Definitions
AEAD SCHEMES. A set of keys is a nonempty set having a distribution (the uniform distribution when the set is finite 
The adversary is assumed to satisfy three conditions, and these must hold regardless of the responses to its oracle queries and regardless of 's internal coins:
Adversary must be nonce-respecting. (The condition is understood to apply only to the adversary's encryption oracle. Thus a nonce used in an encryptionoracle query may be used in a verification-oracle query.)
Adversary may never make a verification-oracle query´AE À Ì µ such that the encryption oracle previously returned Ì in response to a query´AE À Åµ.
Adversary must call its verification-oracle exactly once, and may not subsequently call its encryption oracle. (That is, it makes a sequence of encryptionoracle queries, then a verification-oracle query, and then halts.)
We say that such an adversary forges if its verification oracle returns 1 in response to the single query made to it. The advantage of such an adversary in violating the authenticity of AEAD scheme ¥ ´ µ having key space Ã Ý is Ú ÙØ This is just the ind$-privacy of the randomized symmetric encryption scheme associated to ¥. We comment that we have used a superscript of "ÔÖ Ú" for an IVE scheme and "ÔÖ Ú" (bold font) for an AEAD scheme. to the adversary's first oracle; Õ Ú -the number of oracle queries to the adversary's second oracle; and -the data complexity. The running time Ø of an algorithm is its actual running time (relative to some fixed RAM model of computation) plus its description size (relative to some standard encoding of algorithms). The data complexity is defined as the sum of the lengths of all strings encoded in the adversary's oracle queries, plus the total number of all of these strings. 2 In this paper the length of strings is measured in Ò-bit blocks, for some understood value Ò. The number of blocks in a string Å is defined as Å Ò Ñ Ü ½ Å Ò , so that the empty string counts as one block.
As an example, an adversary that asks queries´AE ½ À ½ Å ½ µ ´AE ¾ À ¾ Å ¾ µ to its first oracle and query´AE À Åµ to its second oracle has data complexity When we use big-O notation it is understood that the constant hidden inside the notation may depend on Ò. We write Ç´ ´Üµµ for Ç´ ´Üµ Ð ´ ´Üµµ. When is a function we write Ì Ñ ´ µµ for the maximal amount of time to compute the function over inputs of total length . When ¥ ´ µ is an AEAD scheme or an IVE scheme with key space Ã Ý we write Ì Ñ ´ µ for the time to compute a random element Ã° Ã Ý plus the maximal amount of time to compute the function Ã on arguments of total length .
Security Results
We first obtain results about the security of EAX2 and then prove a result about the security of a tweakable-OMAC extension. These results are applied to derive results about the security of EAX. The notation and security measures referred to below are defined in Section 5.
SECURITY OF EAX2. We begin by considering the EAX2 ¥ ℄ scheme with being equal to Ê Ò Ò , the set of all functions with domain ¼ ½ Ò and range ¼ ½ Ò . In other words, we are considering the case where Ã½ is a random function with domain ¼ ½ Ò and range ¼ ½ Ò . First we show that EAX2 ¥ Ê Ò Ò ℄ inherits the privacy of the underlying IVE scheme ¥. The proof of the following is in the full version of this paper [8] . 
¾
We now turn to authenticity. The following shows that EAX2 ¥ Ê Ò Ò ℄ provides authenticity under the assumption that the underlying IVE scheme ¥ provides privacy.
The proof is in the full version of this paper [8] . The above allows us to obtain results about the security of the general EAX2 ¥ ℄ scheme based on assumptions about the security of the component schemes. The proof of the following is in the full version of this paper [8] . oracle, when asked´Ø Å ×µ, returns not only Ê ÇÅ Ø ´Å µ but also a key stream Ë ¼ Ë ½ Ë × formed using CTR-mode and start-index Ê. We emphasize that the key stream is formed using the same function (that is, the same key) that underlies the OMAC computation. Note too that we have limited the tweak Ø to a small set, ¼ ½ ¾ .
We imagine providing an adversary with one of two kinds of oracles. The first is an oracle Ç Å ´¡ ¡ ¡µ for a randomly chosen ¾ Ê Ò Ò . The second is an oracle°Ò´¡ ¡ ¡µ that, on input´Ø Å ×µ, returns Ò´× · ½µ random bits. Either way, we assume that the adversary is length-committing: if the adversary asks a query´Ø Å ×µ it does not ask any subsequent query´Ø Å × ¼ µ. As the adversary runs, it asks some sequence of queries´Ø ½ Å ½ × ½ µ ´Ø Õ Å Õ × Õ µ. The resources of interest to us are the sum of the block lengths of the messages being MACed, ½ È Å Ò , and the total number ¾ È × of key-stream blocks that the adversary requests. We claim that a reasonable adversary will have little advantage in telling apart the two oracles, and we bound its distinguishing probability in terms of the resources ½ and ¾ that it expends. Recall that for oracles and and an adversary we measure 's ability to distinguish between oracles and by the number Ú ×Ø ´ µ ÈÖ ½℄ ÈÖ ½℄. The proof of the following is in the full version of this paper [8] . 
We omit the proof, which is completely standard.
